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Introduction 
 
Party politics in Alberta can seem dull.  Election after elec-
tion the Conservative party is returned to power with a com-
fortable majority and campaigns are marked by little in the 
way of suspense (see Bell et al, 2007 and Stewart and Arch-
er, 2000). The last time government changed hands in Al-
berta was 1971 when the Peter Lougheed led Progressive 
Conservatives eked out a narrow win over the Social Credit 
dynasty. Lougheed and the Conservatives positioned them-
selves as safe, conservative change. This was also the case 
when the Progressive Conservatives faced their most serious 
challenge to date, in 1993. The Liberals, led by former Ed-
monton mayor Laurence Decore, launched a fiscal attack on 
the Conservatives, presenting themselves as the safe, con-
servative alternative (Stewart, 1995). The Ralph Klein Con-
servatives beat back that challenge and the party has easily 
carried each subsequent election. 
Yet in December 2009, an Angus Reid poll of 1,000 Al-
bertans suggested 39 percent of voters would cast a ballot for 
a comparatively new party, the Wildrose Alliance, while 25 
percent indicated they would vote for the Progressive Con-
servatives led by Premier Ed Stelmach, 25 percent for the 
Liberals and 9 percent for the NDP. As Jason Fekete noted, 
“[t]he Wildrose Alliance -- buoyed by their recent leadership 
race and by-election win in the Calgary area -- is solidly in 
first place in every region of the province, according to the 
poll (Fekete, 2009).” 
A similar result in a March 2010 poll by the same firm 
heightened the sense that the Tory dynasty might be under 
threat.  In explaining the results, pundits pointed to the 
impact of the Alliance’s dynamic new leader Danielle Smith 
combined with perceptions that the Stelmach Tory govern-
ment had lost its way. Controversy had attended the gov-
ernment’s realignment of oil and gas industry royalties while 
the global economic downturn had seen Alberta finances 
drift into the red for the first time in over a decade (Fong, 
2009). 
Despite its apparent appeal, the new party faces a range 
of challenges in confronting the Tories’ electoral and legisla-
tive dominance.  It must develop policies that position it to 
challenge the Tories, attract adequate financial support 
within a regulatory framework that favours the government, 
and build the organizational components of a viable party. It 
must organize a competent head office around the new lead-
er and establish and maintain viable constituency associa-
tions across the province in order to attract appealing candi-
dates.  And finally, it will need to respond to the Tories de-
fensive strategies, who may try to undercut the new party by 
either stealing its thunder or painting it as a radical, outsider 
party.  
To better understand the Wildrose challenge to the status 
quo, we explore its emergence from before the last provincial 
election through the Calgary-Glenmore by-election and the 
leadership race that selected Smith. We analyze where party 
policy has been positioned in the recent past in relation to 
the political preferences of Albertans. We consider the im-
pact of party leaders on voters and policy making, and com-
pare the finances of the party with those of other parties in 
Alberta, notably the Tories.   
As with the Tories own successful defeat of the Social 
Credit government in 1971, it appears that the Alliance is 
hoping to colonize the ground now held by the government. 
Rather than trying to shift political debate toward the right 
where its own ideological roots lie, it hopes to position itself 
as the best expression of core Albertan values and make use 
of arguably its main asset - an articulate and appealing new 
leader. 
While it does pose a threat to the Tories, the party faces 
major challenges in pursuing this strategy.  It will need to 
manage its links with the energy industry in a way that helps 
it retain some populist appeal and so as to be able to broaden 
its appeal beyond the south of the province.  It must manage 
tensions between fiscal and social conservatives in its ranks, 
and balance its focus on libertarian individualism with Al-
bertan's willingness to accept interventionist government in 
some elements of social, economic and environmental poli-
cy.  
The Wildrose Alliance is competing against a much 
wealthier and larger opponent in the Tories within an open 
party-finance-regime that allows the government to raise 
and spend money in nearly anyway it sees fit. The Tories 
remain a formidable political machine that may well be 
revitalized by the selection of a new leader in 2011. Toppling 
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this behemoth will take considerable effort; one that is only 
likely to succeed if the government is itself internally weak-
ened.  
	  
The Rise of the Wildrose Alliance  
 
Progressive Conservative governments have periodically 
faced challenges from the right, and in 2004 the Alberta 
Alliance party carried almost 10% of the vote and elected a 
member to the legislature. The Alliance party, then led by 
former Social Credit leader Randy Thorsteinson, patterned 
itself on the federal Alliance party and critiqued the Con-
servatives for being insufficiently conservative.  
Before the next election in 2008, the Conservatives 
changed leaders and the Alberta Alliance merged with an-
other right wing party, the Wildrose Party, forming the Wil-
drose Alliance. Capitalizing on the government’s unpopulari-
ty in the Calgary energy industry, the party critiqued the 
Conservative’s royalty plans, and saw funds flow into its 
coffers. Despite this issue and financial support, the party 
lost its only seat and saw a decline in its popular support.  
Even with the disappointment of the 2008 provincial 
election, the Wildrose Alliance did not disappear. During 
2009 it continued to stress the need to “defend Alberta 
against intrusions by the federal government” and press for 
Alberta’s withdrawal from the Canadian Pension Plan. This 
'Alberta first' agenda included opposition to “unfair and 
industry specific taxation from the federal government”, 
demands for “a more equitable distribution of federal trans-
fer payments and contracts” and a requirement that the 
provincial government “collect the Alberta personal income 
tax.”  It called for fixed election dates, recall legislation based 
on signatures of 20% of the electorate, and “binding referen-
dum on a matter of significant public concern upon the 
presentation of a petition signed by at least 10% of the total 
voters at the last Provincial election in Alberta” (Wildrose 
Alliance, 2009). 
Then in September 2009 Wildrose won a by-election for 
recently retired Deputy Premier Ron Stevens’ former seat of 
Calgary-Glenmore. Although the seat had been held by the 
Tories since 1969, the campaign exposed a number of areas 
in which the governing Tories were vulnerable.  Discontent 
with the government’s management of mining royalties 
among members of the Calgary-based oil and gas industry 
was palpable, as was concern with the burgeoning provincial 
debt (CBC, 2009).   
The Alliance focused its campaign on sending “Ed” a 
message and came from a distant third place position in the 
2008 general election to outpoll both the Conservatives and 
the Liberals (Walton and O'Neill, 2009). Apparently, Calgar-
ians were not ready to use the Liberals to send “Ed” such a 
message. The victory sent former leader and one time MLA 
for Cardston-Taber-Warner Paul Hinman back to the pro-
vincial legislature.   
For his part, Hinman had been encouraged to step down 
during the summer of 2009 in the hope that a leadership 
race would spark interest in the party and produce a more 
dynamic spokesperson. The coincidence of the two events 
may well have sharpened attention on the party and helped 
it in Calgary-Glenmore. The next month, October 2009, the 
party selected a dynamic new leader, Danielle Smith and by 
December, found itself ahead of the sitting Tories in opinion 
polls 
 
The Selection of a New Leader 
 
Initially three candidates entered the leadership race: Mark 
Dyrholm, a chiropractor with experience in the Reform Party 
and Canadian Alliance as well as Alberta’s Progressive Con-
servative Party; Jeff Willerton, a writer and businessman 
who has worked for the Canadian Taxpayers Federation; 
and, Danielle Smith, a former director with the Canadian 
Federation of Independent Business who has worked with 
the Fraser Institute, campaigned for the Tories and Reform 
parties, been a member of the Calgary Herald editorial board 
and was once a Global Sunday television host. Smith was 
widely portrayed as the candidate best able to unsettle Prem-
ier Stelmach and defeat the governing Tories (Taube, 2009). 
The leadership race highlighted some of the challenges 
confronting the Wildrose. Willerton hailed from Airdrie, the 
other two candidates both from Calgary, suggestive of the 
limited regional appeal of the party (Braid, 2009). As well, 
there were signs of a struggle for the heart of the fledgling 
organization. Dyrholm was cast as the candidate with great-
est support among social conservatives and Smith as the 
libertarian candidate. Third-placed Willerton was seen as a 
long shot and threw his support to Dyrholm in mid-
September, leaving the social conservative to battle the 
libertarian (Taube, 2009).   
Social conservatives in Alberta have struggled to find a 
viable partisan home since at least the Lougheed era, and 
some saw this as a chance to bring their message to a broad-
er public. Libertarians argued that making social conserva-
tism the core of the party’s message limited its potential for 
growth. Underlying these concerns was a strategic one: the 
party’s central ideological character had direct implications 
for how it would go about challenging the Tories (D'Aliesio, 
2009). 
On October 17th, 2009, the party selected Danielle Smith 
to replace Paul Hinman as leader, with 8,200 party members 
voting (a 71.5% turnout) and 97 spoiled ballots (Sands, 
2009).  Smith made an immediate impact on provincial 
politics, with a range of polls suggesting that under her 
leadership, the Alliance would disrupt if not end the Con-
servative grip on power.  
 
Table 1:  Wildrose Alliance 2009 Leadership Ballot 
 
In her victory speech, Smith noted with approval the support 
of members of the oil and gas industry, and in particular 
Dave Jager, who 'educated me in the nature of the oil and 
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gas industry and introduced me to many influential peo-
ple...'(Smith, 2010). While being close to the oil and gas 
industry may help the Alliance raise money and develop 
policy in this area, this may come at a cost. Despite its cen-
trality to the economic health of the province, our data indi-
cate that Albertan voters are concerned about its impact on 
the environment. They also favour many forms of govern-
ment intervention that may not fit well with Smith’s well-
known libertarian predispositions (Flanagan, 2010). 
 
Assessing the Wildrose Party’s  
Room to Grow 
 
An analysis of the Wildrose platform along with the results 
of a survey of voters in the 2008 election allow us to under-
stand the party and locate it and its supporters in the Alberta 
political milieu. While the respective election platforms 
allow us to locate the ideological positioning of each of the 
political parties, the survey allows us to situate voters and 
non-voters on a range of attitudinal dimensions important in 
Alberta politics.1  Using this information, we are able to 
identify the areas in which the Wildrose Alliance has room to 
grow. 
We are particularly interested in assessing the capacity of 
the party to attract voters away from the governing Con-
servatives and those who did not participate in the 2008 
election, or non-voters. For this initial analysis, we focus on 
the Wildrose platform at that election and the subsequent 
Calgary-Glenmore by-election (see in general, Wildrose 
Alliance, 2008 and Wildrose Alliance, 2009). The analysis 
indicates that the Wildrose anchors one ideological pole on 
most of our measures. But they are also ideological neigh-
bours to the governing Tories, suggesting a direct attack on 
the governments support base is a possibility. 
In 1971 when the Tories defeated the incumbent Social 
Credit government and in 1993 when the Decore Liberals 
threatened the Tories, voter turnout when up by 10 and 6 
percent respectively.  This suggests that bringing former 
non-voters back into the electoral process might be an im-
portant element of success. Former Tory voters are another 
source of potential supporters for the Wildrose Alliance.  So 
we are interested to see the potential for the new party to 
attract both these groups of Albertans. 
Wildrose Alliance policy in during 2008 reflected the in-
fluence of western alienation and populism, two important 
elements of Alberta's political culture (Bell et al, 2007; Stew-
art and Archer, 2000; Tupper, 1996).  Its election platform 
for that year was by far the most ‘populist,’ committing the 
party, if elected, to return power to “the hands of Albertans 
through meaningful electoral reform including MLA recall, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  The survey, a phone interview stratified by region and gender, 
was conducted by NRG Research Group in the week following 
the March 2008. Funding for the survey was provided by the 
University of Calgary’s Institute for Advanced Policy Research. 
fixed election dates and citizen initiated referenda” (Wil-
drose Alliance, 2008). 
 
Figure 1: Populism 
Figure 1 shows that Wildrose supporters are about as popu-
list as Tory voters, and both are close to non-voters. This 
suggests an area where the Wildrose may compete with the 
Tories for voters and non-voters (see Appendix B and C for 
more detailed information) .2 But the party has no basis for 
claiming that it is more in tune with Albertans in this regard 
than are the Tories. The outlier character of the Liberal party 
helps us to understand its struggle for electoral appeal. Its 
supporters anchor the ‘least-populist’ end of the spectrum on 
what is a core element of Alberta political culture. 
With respect to western alienation, the Wildrose plat-
form called for the creation of an Albertan Pension Plan to 
replace the Canadian Pension Plan (CPP) and emphasized 
the value of local control of investment fund decisions (Wil-
drose Alliance 2008; Wildrose Alliance 2009).  This sharply 
alienated position is reflected in the distinctive position of 
supporters seen in Figure 2.  Tory respondents stand be-
tween the Wildrose Alliance and non-voters, giving the party 
a strategic advantage in a potential battle to re-engage these 
voters; it has a shorter distance to bridge in attracting non-
voters.  
 
Figure 2: Western Alienation 
 
Most discussions of Alberta politics stress the conservative 
nature of the province, and the policy priorities of the Wil-
drose Alliance make clear the party’s conservative ideology. 
In 2008 party policy called for secret ballot votes on labour 
union certification, school choice legislation, and the en-
trenchment of “individual property rights within an Alberta 
Bill of Rights.” 3 
Figure 3 displays the level of individualism on our scale 
by the different party supporters.  Supporters of the Wil-
drose Alliance are easily the most individualistic of our re-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Elements of the following analysis rely on various tables presented 
in appendices.  Appendix A provides raw mean scores for all res-
pondents on our attitudinal scales; Appendix B maps standardized 
mean scores of respondents by party support; Appendix C displays 
the standardized absolute differences between party supporting res-
pondents and the mean score by party. Appendix D provides the 
questions from which the six attitudinal scales were developed. 
3  Discussion of the Wildrose Alliance party platform throughout 
this section reflects is found in Wildrose Alliance, 2008 and 
Wildrose, Alliance 2009. 
76	   Canadian Political Science Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2013, 73-86	  
spondents. Conservative voters and non-voters fall closer to 
the Wildrose Alliance than they do the Liberals, but the 
Tories are very close to non-voters on this scale.  Not sur-
prisingly, NDP voters among our respondents are farthest 
away from the Alliance in absolute terms, although Liberal 
supporters are very similar on this measure (see Appendix 
A). 
 
Figure 3: Individualism 
 
Social conservatism is also an important element of the 
Wildrose platform. With respect to crime and social policy, 
the party favoured measures to “ensure that the rights of 
crime victims take precedence over those found guilty of 
committing crimes” and the implementation of “a timely and 
effective Social Assistance to work program”.  Our social 
conservatism scale in Figure 4 is based on two measures, 
attitudes towards abortion and to gay marriage, to identify 
the attitudes of respondents.  
 
Figure 4: Social Conservatism 
 
The socially conservative response is to oppose gay marriage 
and to disagree on the question that abortion is a matter 
between a woman and her doctor. Wildrose supporters are 
clearly much more socially conservative than are those of 
other parties. They are the polar respondents who, with a 30 
percentage points spread, are much farther from non-voters 
than any other group (see Appendix C). Conservative voters 
nearly split the difference between the Wildrose Alliance and 
supporters of all the other parties, and are much closer to 
non-voters than are Wildrose supporters.  
Wildrose policy favours smaller government. Its 2009 
platform called for fiscal responsibility, demanding that red 
tape and regulations be cut by 1/3 and stressed that “the role 
of government is not to own and operate businesses when a 
competitive business market exists” while extolling the value 
of “a zero based budgeting program in all government de-
partments” (Wildrose Alliance, 2009).  Given large increases 
in government spending over recent years, party policy 
implies that the Conservative government has not managed 
the provincial economy in an effective and conservative 
manner. 
Figure 5 captures attitudes toward questions of govern-
ment involvement and spending. This figure displays one of 
the surprising elements of Alberta politics: Although Alber-
tans elect Conservative governments they are general posi-
tively disposed toward government activity. 
 
Figure 5:  Pro-Government 
 
Again, Wildrose Alliance voters take the pole position, being 
the least pro-government (see also Appendix C). The Con-
servatives are between Alliance respondents and non-voters, 
although on this measure, non-voters are generally more like 
supporters of the other parties than they are like Tory or 
Wildrose voters.  
Deference to the energy industry has also been a core el-
ement of Wildrose party policy.  The 2008 platform made 
clear that Albertans should recognize that the “prosperity of 
Alberta is dependent upon the natural resource and energy 
industries” and more recent policy noted that the province 
must “ensure an internationally competitive fiscal regime 
that attracts investment capital and makes reinvestment 
attractive” (Wildrose Alliance,2010a). We asked a number of 
questions relating to the economy and the environment and 
used these to develop the scale of attitudes toward the envi-
ronment in the context of the oil and gas industry. 
As with attitudes toward government spending, Alber-
tans appear to be more open to environmental regulation, 
despite the centrality of resource extraction to the provincial 
economy.  The least pro-environment groups score around .5 
on this scale, suggesting that the environmental stewardship 
is very important to Albertans.  Figure 6 confirms the pat-
tern of Wildrose Alliance voters occupying the polar posi-
tion, they being the least likely to be pro-environment.  The 
Conservative voters are closer to the Wildrose Alliance vot-
 Canadian Political Science Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, 203, 73-86 77 	  
	  
ers than they are to the Liberal voters by a considerable 
degree. However, the non-voters fall much closer to the 
Liberals than to Alliance or Conservative voters.  
 
Figure 6:  Pro-Environment 
 
 
To summarize, Wildrose Alliance and its supporters at the 
2008 provincial election occupied polar positions on each of 
the scales we investigate except for populism, where they 
and Conservative voters are essentially tied. On each scale 
Conservative voters fall closer to Wildrose Alliance voters 
than they do to Liberal voters. If the Wildrose Alliance wish-
es to maximize its support, it appears it should focus on 
those who voted Conservative in 2008. If unseating the 
government requires moving to the centre of politics, ab-
sorbing at least some Tory supporters and attracting non-
voters on the way, the party has a good deal of work to do to 
move off its pole position. For their part Conservatives 
should find it easier to attract non-voters willing to re-enter 
the electoral fray and perhaps even Liberal, Green or NDP 
supporters than will Wildrose. For the Tories, linking the 
Wildrose to its historically polar position in provincial poli-
tics – marginalizing the party - is one obvious defensive 
strategy. 
Non-voters are closer to the Alliance than to the Liberals 
with respect to western alienation, populism, and individual-
ism. If annoyance with the Conservatives on these issues 
draws non-voters out at the next election, they are more 
likely to express their displeasure by voting for the Alliance 
rather than the Liberals. However, non-voters are closer to 
the Liberals on government programs, social conservatism 
and the environment. If these are the issues that motivate 
non-voters, they should find it easier to vote for the Liberals 
over Wildrose. This suggests that the framing of the agenda 
on which the next election is fought will be critical to its 
outcome; an exercise in which party leaders play a key role. 
 
The Importance of Party Leaders 
 
Much has been made of the importance of party leaders in 
Canadian politics. Reg Whitaker has written of the “re-
placement of traditional parties by ‘virtual parties’ brought 
together around would-be party leaders” (Whitaker, 2001: 
16). He makes specific reference to what happened in Alber-
ta in 1992 and 1993, when Ralph Klein became leader and 
“his chief competitor was blown all the way into the leader-
ship of the Alberta Liberal party” (19). Leadership changes 
then can have a dramatic impact on party politics. In a simi-
lar vein, Grant Amyot points to the “enhanced role of lead-
ers” and notes that “the media have played a role in the 
increased importance of leaders” (2007, 508-509). 
 
Table 2: Party Thermometer Ratings by Party Support (Max 
100) 
 
Party policy and party organization are now inextricably 
linked with the leader. Moderating the Wildrose Alliance 
policy and building a competent organization are central 
tasks facing Danielle Smith. This challenge is captured in 
part in Table 2, which makes clear that the Wildrose has the 
least appeal for all but Tory voters. Fully 84% of our re-
spondents held a negative view of the party (a score of 50 or 
lower) in 2008, something it will have to work on if it is to 
broaden its appeal. 
Again there is evidence that PC and non-voters are likely 
the best source of potential Wildrose voters.   If we limit our 
attention to the Conservative voters, we see that they gave 
higher scores to the Wildrose Alliance than did supporters of 
other parties, with non-voters being the next most support-
ive group. Tories also ranked the Wildrose above all other 
parties, consistent with the party being their second vote 
choice. However, the gap between non-voters’ perceptions of 
the Tory and Wildrose party suggests the party has much 
work to do if it is to draw these potential voters into an elec-
tion. 
Leadership evaluations are one area in which Danielle 
Smith is hoping to do much better than her predecessor.  In 
2008, Paul Hinman as Wildrose leader struggled to attract 
support (see Table 3).  About 81% of voters held a negative 
view (a score of 50 or lower) of Hinman.  Even Wildrose 
supporters were not particularly strongly attached to Hin-
man, which might help explain his willingness to step aside 
in favour of a leadership contest.  Hinman was the second 
most popular leader among Tory voters, ahead of the Mason 
and Taft, with Wildrose voters returning the favour with 
regard to Premier Stelmach.  Wildrose looks best placed to 
capitalize on disaffected Conservatives than are the Liberals, 
particularly as Smith's accession to the leadership strength-
ens the party's appeal.  The replacement for David Swann, 
who resigned as leader on February 1, 2011, by Raj Sherman 
is an opportunity for the party to rebuild its support in the 
medium term. 
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Table 3: Leader Thermometer Ratings by Party Support  
(Max. 100) 
 
Regional Variation in Support 
Regional variation in support plays an important role in 
Alberta politics, shaping the selection of leaders, the devel-
opment of public policy and electoral success.  The by-
election that inspired much of the discussion as to the 
prospects for political change took place in Calgary, where 
support for the Stelmach government was relatively weak. 
The Wildrose Alliance performed much better in Calgary 
in the 2008 election than it did in Edmonton or northern 
Alberta more broadly.  
Calgary has been an area of weakness for the Stelmach 
Conservatives. As Table 4 shows, the Conservatives re-
ceived their lowest vote share in the city in the 2008 elec-
tion. Calgary was not particularly supportive of Stelmach 
even before the election. In the 2006 leadership election, 
Stelmach did not carry a plurality of support in any 
Calgary riding and his overall support in the city was a 
paltry 14%. Jim Dinning was strong in Calgary, with Ted 
Morton strongest in areas further south (Stewart and Say-
ers, 2008).  This north-south division has been a constant 
source of tension within the PCs, with the leadership gener-
ally alternating between a southerner and northerner since 
Peter Lougheed led the party to success in 1971. 
In order to challenge the Conservatives, the Alliance must 
demonstrate strength across all regions of the province, 
and in particular, beyond its base of power in the south. 
Even in Calgary, feelings towards the Wildrose Alliance 
were not particularly high in 2008.  Calgarians were 
much more warmly disposed towards the Liberals (Table 
5). 
 
Table 4: Regional Variation in Vote 2008 Election 
 
This offers some evidence that the by-election results may 
well have been aimed at sending a direct message to the 
Stelmach Tories and may not be a harbinger of wider 
change. As one voter who supported the Alliance in the 
Calgary Glenmore by-election explained to CBC: “I’ve been a 
Conservative all my life like any normal Albertan... But I 
think that people do need to be put on their toes a little bit 
and I think that’s the message I would like to see them get at 
this time” (CBC, 2009). 
There is a clear strength to the Conservative brand in Al-
berta. When we look at party identification, we find a huge 
advantage for the Conservatives and see that the Wildrose 
Alliance had a tiny base of identifiers at the time of the 2008 
Election. As Table 6 indicates, Tory identifiers were 10 times 
more numerous than Alliance supporters. 
 
 
 
Table 5: Region and Party Thermometer Rating (Max. 100)  
 
Even New Democrats and Liberals entered the election with 
a higher base of identifiers. The Alliance needs to create an 
electoral coalition from very low base in an environment 
where the Conservative brand remains strong. The resilience 
of existing ties to each party will be critical to vote changing 
in the next election.  
 
Table 6: Provincial Party Identification 2008 
 
Given the central role of leaders in Canadian parties, losing 
the leadership issue to the Alliance could have devastating 
implications for the long-dominant Conservative party. It 
might allow Danielle Smith to reposition the Wildrose Alli-
ance for success and to control the political agenda.  While it 
is possible that current excitement over the prospects of the 
Wildrose Alliance is overblown, the Conservative party needs 
to react effectively if it is to ward off this challenge. Solidify-
ing caucus support and careful consideration of the policy 
terrain to both its left and right will be central components 
of any coherent Tory response. The new Conservative leader 
will be critical to how such endeavours play out. 
 
A New Leader and New Policy Directions 
 
Danielle Smith understands that successful insurgent parties 
in Alberta have attacked incumbent parties from the centre 
(Vivone, 2009).  In January 2010 she said as much: 
 
"When you gave me the privilege to lead the Wildrose Alliance, I 
promised we would build a big-tent, mainstream, conservative 
party that would reflect the common sense values of Albertans 
and a principled approach to government - a party that would 
define a new vision for Alberta and focus on several key priori-
ties" (Wildrose Alliance, 2010a).  
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Her central task is to indicate through her leadership that 
the Wildrose Alliance is a moderate, inclusive and therefore 
electable party. This includes balancing her own libertarian 
preferences with those of social conservatives in the party 
and appealing to Albertans who are comfortable with gov-
ernment intervention in a range of economic, social and 
environmental policy areas. Yet as we have seen, she inherit-
ed a party that in policy terms was to the right - and on some 
issues, extremely so - of the governing party and most voters 
and non-voters.  
Smith seems to have been successful at moderating and 
sidelining a number of potentially damaging policies at the 
party’s June 2010 Annual General Meeting in Red Deer. The 
party rejected a resolution that would have strengthened the 
right of citizens to own guns. It removed a previous com-
mitment to designate teachers as essential workers, limiting 
their capacity to strike, and rejected a resolution aimed at 
introducing nuclear power to the province. As well, it sof-
tened language that implied support for private health care.4 
Despite these moves, the party maintained elements of 
its conservative, populist approach. It retained support for 
charter schools, an increased role for private health care, 
binding referenda on important issues, and confirmed an 
aversion to deficits. It retained its policy of allowing workers 
to opt out of unions and to require secret certification and 
decertification votes, while its replacement policy with re-
gard to teachers as essential workers appears to leave open 
the question of whether they should be allowed to strike.  
Members voted for whistle-blower legislation, an Alberta 
constitution, and to study the practicability of a provincial 
police force.  They passed a policy aimed at limiting access to 
guns for criminals but not others.  
The policy convention made clear the party remains a 
strong supporter of the oil and gas industry, with members 
passing a motion emphasizing the need to move cautiously 
with regard to climate change, aiming to make decisions 
based on the 'best available scientific data.'  Smith, whose 
leadership campaign relied heavily on funding and advice 
from leading members of this industry, made public state-
ments in support of this view of climate change science and 
pointed to the centrality of the industry to the prosperity and 
future of the Alberta economy (Fekete ,2010; Wildrose  
Alliance, 2010; Thomson, 2010). 
At the end of the conference, Smiths claimed, perhaps 
rhetorically, that the proposals reflected a "...level of maturi-
ty I didn't expect to see this early on" (Thomson, 2010).  At 
the same time, she appeared to be prompting any wavering 
Tory MLAs by noting that the 'door was closing' on members 
crossing the floor of the legislature to join the Wildrose Party 
(Fekete, 2010). 
Doubts remain as to the success of this moderation strat-
egy. As we have seen,  while populism and western aliena-
tion remain cornerstones of Alberta political culture, Alber-
tans are open to attempts to raise levels of taxation on the oil 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4  This discussion relies on Fekete, 2010, Wildrose  Alliance, 2010, 
and Thomson, 2010. 
and gas industry, are concerned about the environment, and 
are more supportive of an activist government that is im-
plied by the new Wildrose platform (Stewart and Sayers, 
2009).  The party's position that it will only pursue "fact-
based stewardship of the environment" is consistent with 
Smith's public statement with regard to climate change that 
"the science isn't settled" (Fekete, 2010), but may not cap-
ture the mood of Albertans with respect to this issue. 
Smith continues to use the wide remit of the party leader 
to develop new policies in preparation for a 2011 or 2012 
election. Two themes are evident in these announcements: 
one is a populist appeal to voters shaped as a rejection of the 
‘centralizing’ approach of the incumbent Tories in favour of 
local, decentralized decision making. The other, reminiscent 
of that made by Laurence Decore in 1993,  is an attempt to 
present the party as best placed to offer sensible fiscal man-
agement in the face of radical shifts in government revenues 
associated with swings in oil and gas prices. 
In recognition of the importance of the oil and gas indus-
try to her leadership and the provincial economy, Smith 
launched an ‘Energy Task Force’ on November 10th to de-
velop party policy in this area. She appointed David Yager, 
who had helped organize her leadership campaign, and 
David Gray to head the taskforce5.   The task force was asked 
to develop a policy to “restore investor confidence, stream-
line the regulatory process, properly reclaim land, manage 
environmental risks and help communities across the prov-
ince...." (Widrose Alliance, 2009).  Its report, released in 
March 2010, quotes Smith as saying “The Wildrose Alliance 
Caucus will judge success of the Alberta Competitiveness 
Review (a promised Tory policy) by increased oil and gas 
investment and employment” (Wildrose Alliance, 2010). 
Smith and Wildrose played to the populist strand in Al-
berta politics by attacking the perquisites of politicians 
through the establishment of a task force into the pay and 
conditions of Albertan MLA's. This was headed by long time 
conservative activist, Senator Elect, and Chair of the Citi-
zen's Centre for Freedom and Democracy Link Byfield (who 
subsequently became a candidate for the party), who again 
had supported Smith in the leadership race. 
Announcing the party’s educational plan on September 
9th, 2010, Smith blamed bureaucratic centralization for the 
major problems facing the sector in Alberta.  In her subse-
quent presentation of the policy, she gives credit to the To-
ries for pursuing a policy that encourages flexibility, where 
funding ‘follows students,’ but claims the Tories have strayed 
from this approach and that the Wildrose strengthen choice 
and local control. 
This was followed by the party’s environment policy on 
September 15th. The policy avoids detailed discussion of the 
environmental aspects of the oil sands. In accompanying 
notes there is criticism of the government for not better 
managing the image of the oil sands.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5  Yager was at the time CEO of oil and gas company HSE Inte-
grated Limited and Chairman of the Petroleum Services Asso-
ciation of Canada; Gray at the time was Executive Director of the 
Office of the Utilities Consumer Advocate. 
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Alberta’s oil sands have been unfairly portrayed both here and 
around the world. Images of black open pit mines and murky 
tailings ponds are what immediately spring to mind for many 
people when it comes to Alberta’s hydrocarbon economy. These 
often powerful images create a strong emotional reaction and 
lead some people to conclude that the best interests of our econ-
omy end when the best interests of our environment begin 
(Smith, 2010a).  
 
Cleaning up tailings ponds does receive attention as a means 
of reducing their negative impact on the image of the oil 
sands.  But the main focus is on ‘clear air clean land, and 
clean water.’  The policy focuses on reducing pollutants (not 
CO2), encouraging greater use of natural gas for transporta-
tion, and managing water for the energy industry and agri-
culture. The policy announcement notes the many good 
things being done now, but that some changes need to be 
made to continue to allow the exploitation of oil and gas in 
Alberta.  
On October 4th, Smith returned to education, announc-
ing the party’s advanced education policy. The focus was on 
reducing the cost to students, allowing debt forgiveness, 
encouraging greater linkages between universities and en-
suring yet again ‘money followed students.’ October 21st saw 
her release the party’s policies on municipalities, once again 
emphasizing the importance of local decision making against 
the ‘centralizing’ approach of the current government (Wil-
drose Alliance, 2010a; Wildrose Alliance 2010b). 
On November 24th, the party announced its ‘Democracy 
and Accountability’ policy. This policy included strengthen-
ing the Offices of the Auditor General and the Ethics Com-
missioner, whistleblower legislation, a range of measures to 
enhance government transparency and a new process for 
dealing with MLA pay increases (the government increased 
MLA pay by up to 35% just after the 2008 election). The 
party also claims to favour fixed election dates, more free 
votes in the legislature, recall of provincial MLAs, and the 
election of federal Senators. 
These policy announcements often recognize the contri-
bution of the incumbent Tories and avoid strident criticism 
of the government except with respect to the democracy and 
accountability component. They arguably position the party 
as representing a ‘return’ to traditional conservative values, 
and in particular, the populist roots of conservatism in Al-
berta. The policies are not in areas that might have been 
considered ‘core’ to the pre-2010 Alliance, although they are 
crafted to be consistent with core principles of the party – 
such as maximizing individual choice, limiting the state, and 
maintaining the centrality of oil and gas in the province.  
They are all issues that are of interest to both rural and ur-
ban Albertans, and recognize the growing importance of the 
need to balance economic development and environmental 
protection. 
 
Financing and Party Organization 
 
In addition to the need to reposition party policy, to be suc-
cessful Wildrose needs to build and sustain a party organiza-
tion of three parts:  a legislative branch, broadly representa-
tive constituency associations, and a head (leader's) office 
with associated executive and professional services.  As well, 
the party needs to be able to raise funds and build a compe-
tent election campaign team to challenge the well-
established Tories.  
Building the leaders' office and party executive has prov-
en to be a challenge for Smith.  In the early stages of her 
leadership, a range of people came and went from the execu-
tive and her office, with important functions such as fund-
raising suffering as a consequence. Her original choice for 
chief advisor and strategist, Stephen Carter, stepped down 
after making fun of Premier Stelmach's accent and in the 
face of the insolvency of his event organizing company (CBC, 
2009a). In February 2010, Carter was replaced with Shan-
non Stubbs who carried the title Executive Assistant, with 
Victor Marciano, a federal Conservative party operative, 
joining Wildrose as executive director. In October 2010, 
Stubbs was nominated as the Wildrose candidate in Fort 
Saskatchewan – Vegreville, the Premier’s riding. After help-
ing to organize the successful campaign of Calgary’s Mayor 
Nenshi, Carter returned briefly as special advisor to Smith, 
before departing again in February 2011 to run Alison Red-
ford’s campaign for leadership of the Tory party.   
After some false starts, Wildrose moved in the spring of 
2010 to improve its fundraising efforts in order to give itself 
a chance of competing with the well-funded Tories. By mid- 
2010, the party appeared to have settled on an executive, 
including a number of members with experience in fundrais-
ing as well as in establishing new firms. Perhaps most nota-
bly, Hal Walker, a former Tory and president of the Calgary 
Elbow PC Association who helped run election campaigns 
for former Premier Ralph Klein, joined the party in April 
2010 and became party president.  Alan Napier was tasked 
with professionalizing the party's fundraising efforts by 
building a new firm to run the database and direct contact 
process that builds and maintains fundraising links with 
supporters.  
As is evident in Figure 7, 2008 was a banner year for the 
Wildrose, with its election year fundraising much ahead of 
its electoral performance. Many attributed the Alliance’s 
success to annoyance with the government’s new royalty 
regime among energy companies (Libin, 2010). Only the 
Wildrose Alliance came out in opposition to a more aggres-
sive royalty regime. Corporate money flowing to the party in 
the 2008 campaign was almost ten times as much as the 
party received in the 2004 election period. It almost 
matched the Conservatives in campaign revenue and outdis-
tanced both of its major opponents to the left of the Tories.  
The Conservative party suffered a major decline in cam-
paign revenue from 2004. It received only $580, 000 in 
2008 while during the election campaign of 2004 its coffers 
overflowed with more than $2 million. But the huge fund-
raising advantage enjoyed by the Conservative party 
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throughout the four year fundraising cycle gave it a major 
advantage in the 2008 election campaign, with the Wildrose 
Alliance being unable to capitalize on its financial success 
(Stewart and Sayers, 2009). 
The party’s weakness was evident at the candidate level 
as the mean expenditures for Wildrose Alliance party candi-
dates trailed both the NDP and the Liberals and were not 
even 15% of the Conservative candidate mean. The challenge 
faced by the party in 2008 is further evidenced by the fact 
that in 62 of the 83 provincial ridings, the Wildrose Alliance 
candidate spent less than $5000. Even in the riding the 
party won in 2004, they were outspent by the Conservatives 
in 2008. 
Wildrose also had its best non-campaign fundraising 
year in 2008, when it raised more than either the Liberals or 
the New Democrats.  However, this ranking displays the gap 
between the government and the major opposition parties. 
The Alliances $726, 936 was only a third of what the Tories 
raised that year. 
 
Figure 7:  Donations to Political Parties in Alberta 
 
The Alliance’s corporate support grew to almost match the 
individual contributions in the 2007. In the 2008 election 
period, almost 90% of the party’s individual donations came 
in amounts of over $5000. In contrast, less than half of the 
Conservative campaign revenue, and less than 20% of the 
annual revenue came from such large sources.  For the 2008 
election then, the Wildrose Alliance was heavily dependent 
on a small number of large donors. The 2008 annual figures 
did not change this pattern. In 2008, Wildrose Alliance 
received just $23,313 in donations of less than $375. In 
contrast the Liberals received $201,741, the New Democrats, 
$270,206 and the PCs $281,825. (Stewart and Sayers, 
2009). 
The importance of corporate donations, mainly from the 
Calgary based energy sector, highlights the southern charac-
ter of the party during this time. This is also seen in the 
pattern of individual donations, which in 2008 were over-
whelmingly from voters in Calgary and the southern part of 
the province.  However, 2009 was not a successful year for a 
party hoping to challenge the Tories.  The sitting govern-
ment attracted more than five times as much as the Wildrose 
party ($2,379,591 to $428,312). Moreover, the party ranked 
behind both the Liberals and NDP in fundraising.  The party 
financing regime in Alberta, which provides for no limita-
tions on the raising and spending of funds, allows the Tories 
to both raise and spend vast quantities of money as they 
attempt to snuff out the upstart Wildrose Alliance party. 
In terms of party organization, Paul Hinman's win in 
Calgary-Glenmore marked a watershed for Wildrose, provid-
ing it with representation in the legislature, resources, and a 
focus for its efforts.  In January 2010, Tory backbenchers 
Heather Forsyth (Calgary-Fish Creek) and newcomer Rob 
Anderson (Airdrie-Chestermere) left their caucus to sit as 
Wildrose MLAs.  There were indications at the time that up 
to 10 Tories were considering the move (CBC, 2010). 
At the June policy convention, Smith announced the ad-
dition of independent MLA (and former Tory cabinet minis-
ter) Guy Boutilier (Fort McMurray-Wood Buffalo) to the 
party's legislative roster (although Boutilier took some time 
to formally advise the Speaker of his change of status). As 
well, Smith announced that the party had been successful in 
building constituency associations in all 83 provincial rid-
ings.  It began announcing successful nomination candidates 
in the fall of 2010 (Fekete, 2010).  
While a powerful indicator of the party’s appeal, a num-
ber of nominations have been controversial (Slade and Fe-
kete, 2010) and will generate other challenges for the party. 
For example, the nomination of Link Byfield in the riding of 
Barrhead-Morinville-Westlock in October highlights the 
continuing challenge facing the party with respect to elec-
toral positioning. The high profile Byfield is widely known as 
the strongly conservative publisher of Alberta Reports and as 
a ‘Senator in waiting’ for Alberta. An early supporter of the 
Wildrose Alliance and of Smith, the party will have to man-
age the impression that he may be more conservative than 
many or most Albertans. 
The party faces organizational challenges within the leg-
islature. Despite having two more MLA’s than the two per-
son NDP caucus, the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly 
Ken Kowalski has denied the party access to leadership 
funds (around $230,000) received by all parties in the legis-
lature, citing the fact that Smith does not hold a seat. Such a 
designation would have strengthened its legislative and 
organizational presence, and given it a more powerful voice 
in question period. As well, the Speaker’s Office has indicat-
ed that the party is not to include quotes from Smith in its 
official caucus news releases (Fekete, 2010a).  
The Alliance has made impressive strides in building its 
own financial and organizational resources, but confronts a 
party that enjoys vast organizational and financial ad-
vantages.  While much has been made of the province’s slide 
into deficit budgeting, its overall fiscal situation is still the 
best of any government in Canada. This, combined with the 
potential enlivening effect of a leadership race and a new 
leader, makes unseating the Tories daunting task. 
 
Discussion 
 
In general, an insurgent party such as Wildrose may attempt 
to usurp the position of the current dominant party or re-
shape the political agenda to its advantage. The matching 
strategies for the incumbent party are to reassert itself as 
best placed to defend core values, presenting the newcomer 
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as outside mainstream opinion, or to strike out in a new 
direction itself (Downs 1957; Stokes 1963; Riker, 1983; 
Green, 2007: 631; Riker, 2008: 17-19).  As in the past (1971, 
1993), the current battle appears to revolve around defining 
and capturing the centre of Alberta politics; the Wildrose 
attacking the Tories as out of touch with core values, the 
Tories painting the Wildrose as extreme. 
A poll in early 2011 suggested a drop in support for the 
Wildrose Alliance and has Tories as the first choice of a 
plurality of Albertans (Thomson, 2011).  The 25-30% share 
enjoyed by the Wildrose Alliance in this opinion poll is much 
like the level of support captured by the Western Canada 
Concept party during the recession of the early-to-mid 
1980s; support that dried up once the economy recovered. 
As well, the total Liberal and NDP vote share has remained 
fairly stable over the last year, suggesting that voters have 
yet to move en masse from the Tories 
As for the Tories, the Premier’s difficulty in projecting a 
positive media image has been a major problem for the 
party, despite some notable policy successes.  Premier Stel-
mach’s decision to step down, announced on January 25th 
2011 but to take effect at an as yet unspecified date in late 
2011, may relieve the party of this difficulty. Much will de-
pend on his successor; the right new leader may well blunt 
the impact of Danielle Smith and Wildrose. 
Beyond leadership concerns, a series of controversial 
pieces of government legislation appear to offer Wildrose 
opportunities to attack the Tories. Bill 19, The Land Assem-
bly Project Area Act, received Royal Assent on May 26th, 
2009.  The Act empowers the government to purchase land 
for major infrastructure projects.  It allows the government 
to prevent other uses for land deemed necessary for essential 
infrastructure development without necessarily purchasing 
it or compensating current owners. This restriction on use 
would likely diminish the value of the land. Not surprisingly, 
large land owners have expressed concern over this legisla-
tion (APRI, 2011). 
Bill 36, The Alberta Land Stewardship Act (ALSA), re-
ceived Royal Assent on June 4, 2009.  It has proven to be a 
lightning rod for discontent by landowners – particularly 
rural landowners – with respect to their capacity to control 
their land and claim compensation for other uses, such as oil 
and gas exploration and government expropriation. Sections 
dealing with expropriation, sub-soil rights, and appeals have 
attracted particular criticism. Ignored is the fact that it is the 
first serious attempt to deal with uncertainties and to make 
use of a Land-Use Framework (LUF) that adopts common 
and transparent standards for the whole province.  
Bill 50, the Electric Statutes Amendment Act, which re-
ceived its final reading in the Alberta Legislative Assembly 
on November 25th 2009 and Royal Assent on the 26th, 
added to the perception that the government is reshaping 
property rights in Alberta. This legislation removes the pre-
vious requirement for public hearings with respect to the 
construction of new electrical power lines. It makes the 
approval process much like that for other infrastructure such 
as roads and hospitals which do not require public hearings 
if they are deemed critical.  The cost of the expansion of the 
electricity grid, up to $15 billion, would be borne by power 
consumers through their electricity bills. 
In 2010, in pursuit of its carbon policy, the government 
introduced Bill 24, the Carbon Capture and Storage Statutes 
Amendment Act, which received its third reading on Decem-
ber 1st and Royal Assent on December 2nd of that year.  
Because it provides for potential storage of carbon within the 
empty spaces below surface, it requires the provincial gov-
ernment to claim these spaces as Crown property. Some 
have drawn the conclusion that current sub-surface rights 
are extinguished (APRI, 2010). 
Not surprisingly, the Danielle Smith and the Wildrose Al-
liance have seized on the opportunity to paint the govern-
ment as beyond the pale; as having abandoned a central 
tenet of Alberta society, the centrality of property rights. In 
attacking property rights, according to Wildrose,  the gov-
ernment is violating another important principle, local con-
trol, in favour of centralism.  
 
The problem with all three bills is that they represent the biggest 
property rights grab in Alberta history.  We see a pattern in this 
legislation of centralizing decision making, of undermining 
landowner rights and of denying full, fair and timely compensa-
tion (Vegreville Observer, 2010). 
 
The evidence presented here suggests the Wildrose Alli-
ance is identifying the central elements of Alberta’s political 
traditions, and claiming to be more in tune with these than 
the government. It is worth keeping in mind that in this 
regard, its actual policies may be less important than percep-
tions of its policies. 
The Alliance must discredit the Tories’ performance on 
those issues that are seen as central to politics in Alberta and 
move aggressively into Tory territory by presenting itself as 
more competent and in tune with Albertans. Its press releas-
es regularly target the Premier as having failed to properly 
manage core components of government, initially the energy 
sector so vital to the provinces economy, and more recently 
health care, and fiscal policy, all primary concerns for voters 
in Alberta (Sayers and Stewart 2009). Recent discussion of 
education, the environment and the wider economy share a 
similar tone.  The Tories are failing to uphold the traditions 
that are held to be central to Albertan political culture. 
Yet the party faces challenges in moving to the middle of 
politics in Alberta. The Alliances non-interventionist, small 
government approach to regulation is at odds with evidence 
that voters favour more government regulation and a robust 
role for government with respect to health care and educa-
tion. Its unwillingness to accept the need for action on car-
bon may be at odds with widespread concern for the envi-
ronment and support for some form of government action 
on this file. 
The party must deal with the north – south divide in the 
province, and the perception that it is a southern party. Oil 
and gas exploration has been one of the underlying irritants 
for rural Albertans who are currently upset with Tory land 
use legislation. The association between Calgary and ‘big-oil’ 
is not always viewed positively in other parts of the province, 
and the Wildrose must work to move beyond its southern 
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heartland if it is to be successful. And close links with the oil 
and gas companies do not necessarily square with a populist 
image.  
Tensions between social and fiscal conservative, which at 
times run along rural-urban lines, are also a challenge for 
the party. There may be advantages using themes such as 
local control, property rights and prudence rather than 
smaller government to bridge this divide. These ideas allow 
moral conservatives to imagine a political space in which 
they can pursue their preferred social arrangements.  The 
question remains as to whether this strategy is able to bind 
social and fiscal conservatives – and former being some of its 
most passionate members – together. In everything from 
selecting candidates to the words Smith uses, it would seem 
there is a need to avoid extremes that play to the Tories 
attempt to paint Wildrose as out of step with Albertans. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Our analysis suggests that the next election will be a struggle 
over the central ground of Alberta politics combined with 
sharp competition for the mantle of leadership that has been 
so important in the politics of the province; a province that 
has had only 7 leaders in the last 75 years.  
The Wildrose Alliance is attempting to present itself as 
more moderate than in the past. Advertising its populist and 
western roots, downplaying its moral conservative elements 
and rebranding its libertarian impulses are all part of this 
strategy. The message is to be delivered by an energetic and 
appealing leader, with the Tories framed as out of touch with 
core Alberta values. 
To do this, the Wildrose Alliance must negotiate tradi-
tional tensions in Albertan politics: strong support for indi-
vidualism yet wide and deep commitment to public health 
care and robust government; a north-south divide; rural-
urban tensions; and differences in outlook between social 
and fiscal conservatives in its ranks and beyond. At the same 
time, the party must appear to be aligned with the populism 
and western alienation that run deep in the province. 
The Tory response centres on defending what it sees as 
its traditional ground by claiming to be the quintessential 
Albertan party while painting the Alliance as outsiders.  This 
strategy is likely to include focusing on the gap between the 
Alliance and voter expectations of state activity in areas such 
as health care, the environment and the economy. Regional 
variation in Alliance support and the foibles of inexperienced 
candidates will be grist to this mill.  The Tories much larger 
financial resources will fund this process while a new leader 
may well sharpen its focus.  
Already the Tories are responding to criticisms of recent 
legislation as well as other areas where the Wildrose might 
attack them. During the 2010 spring session, the govern-
ment plans to introduce a number of amendments to the 
Alberta Land Stewardship Act to soften the perception that it 
is not a strong supporter of private property rights.  As well, 
it plans to introduce legislation toughening some criminal 
penalties and providing greater compensation for victims of 
crime. It will also strengthen securities regulation and re-
lease a new education framework (Fekete, 2011). 
These are rare times in Alberta: The Liberals and Con-
servatives are seeking new leaders; A Liberal caucus member 
has mused openly about running for the leadership of the 
new – and largely unknown – Alberta Party, which now has 
an MLA in Dave Taylor; and The New Democrat caucus is 
small but effective in the Legislative Assembly.  Unpredicta-
bility and the possibility of widespread electoral competition 
promises an exceptionally interesting period of politics in 
what has long been a rather dull, one-party dominant sys-
tem. 
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Appendix A:   
Mean Raw Scores for Survey Respondents on Six Major Attitu-
dinal Scales 
	  
	  
	  
Appendix B:  
Mean Standardized Scores on Six Attitudinal Scales by Party 
Support  
	  
86	   Canadian Political Science Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2013, 73-86	  
Appendix C:  
Absolute Distance of Respondents from Standardized Mean 
Score by Party Respondents  
	  	  	  
	  
 Canadian Political Science Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, 203, 73-86 87 	  
	  
Appendix D:   
Survey Questions used to Construct Attitudinal Scales 
	  
Figure 1 Populism 
Trust ordinary people more than experts* 58% 
Solve problems if govt brought back to grassroots* 75% 
Need govt with less red tape* 86%  
 
Figure 2 Western Alienation 
Alberta is treated unfairly by the federal government: 46% 
Alberta does not have its fair share of political power in Canada: 
56% 
The economic policies of the federal government seem to help 
Quebec and Ontario at the expense of Alberta: 65% 
Because parties depend on Quebec and Ontario Alberta usually 
gets ignored in national politics: 70% 
 
Figure 3 Individualism 
Government regulation stifles drive* 48% 
Most unemployed could find jobs* 71% 
Those willing to pay should get medical treatment sooner* 43% 
A lot of welfare and social programs unnecessary* 30% 
 
Figure 4 Social Conservatism 
Abortion a matter between a woman and her doctor* 76% 
Gays and Lesbians should be allowed to marry* 62% 
 
Figure 5 Pro-Government 
Govt ensure decent living standard* 73% 
Govt ensure adequate housing* 78% 
Government should take over auto insurance* 46% 
Government should limit amount of rent increases*76% 
 
Figure 6 Pro-Environment 
Oil and Gas companies have too much say in provincial politics* 
69% 
Alberta should slow pace of Oil Sands Development* 53% 
Tough Environmental Standards should take precedence over 
employment* 58% 
Alberta needs to take firm action to combat Global Warming*82% 
Royalties on natural gas and oil should be increased*56% 
 
* An asterisk here and in future tables indicates significant at the 
0.05 level or better. 
	  
